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1. Introduction and setting the scene 
Whilst airlines around the globe find it difficult to generate sustainable profit margins (e.g. Merkert 
and Pearson, 2014), it is unsurprising that this is particularly pertinent in peripheral areas, where air 
services are often essential to the social and economic life of the region, whilst patronage levels are on 
average low. Scheduled air services are therefore often regarded as public goods in regions where 
such services are not commercially viable. This in turn results in government intervention in the form 
of providing, protection from route competition, guaranteeing part or most of the revenues, 
subsidising these services and/or guaranteeing minimum service levels such as timetabling and 
maximum fares (for an overview of possible interventions including their social welfare implications 
see Nolan et al., 2005). If governments, public transport or regional authorities procure such transport 
services (as opposed to producing them internally), they are governed by a contractual relationship 
between a principal (transport authority) and agent (operator) (for details on the agency theory see 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Examples for public support for air services exist in many countries; the most 
noteworthy being the Essential Air Service (EAS) program in the United States (e.g. Wittman, 2014; 
Matisziw et al., 2012), the PSO air service scheme in Europe (e.g. Merkert and Williams 2013), the 
Remote Air Services Subsidy (RASS) Scheme in Australia (e.g. Merkert and Hensher, 2013) as well 
as similar schemes in India and Canada (e.g. Metrass-Mendes et al., 2011; Ouellette et al., 2010). 
Albeit despite on-going austerity pressures the remote air service policy debates are active in all of the 
regions mentioned above as there is increasing interest in making the PSO air services more efficient 
to improve their value for money. We argue that austerity (or any cost reducing) pressure also offers a 
chance for government officials to take a fresh look at the way they procure such services.  Such 
reviews should not be dominated by existing practice, which will usually favour the incumbent 
operator. Effort can be made to seek innovative ideas to make their contract offers more attractive to 
operators and more financially viable for the public purse.  
 
In Europe the approved approach is to procure public service obligation (PSO) air services (e.g., 
Reynolds-Feighan, 1995) and it has been shown that air PSOs in Europe contribute significant social 
and economic benefits (Bråthen and Halpern, 2012). However, despite the European Commission’s 
harmonisation aspirations, the interpretation and application of the PSO air service mechanism differs 
substantially across the European member states (e.g. Merkert and Williams, 2013). A member state 
may impose PSOs on dedicated routes or a bundle of routes, if it judges that air services are vital for 
the economic and/or social development of the regions these routes serve and that without subsidies 
(either to the airlines or to local residents as is the case in Spain, e.g. Cabrera et al., 2011) and/or 
regulatory measures to protect them, no satisfactory scheduled air services to these regions would be 
maintained. In many ways this illustrates that the politics of regulatory governance matter. As the 
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interpretation of the relevant European Commission directives can be challenged in court, their 
potential latitude of interpretation does not only highlight the need for local adaption, but also permits 
local transport authorities and operators to come forward with innovations and different approaches 
that have the potential to improve the cost-efficiency and value of their specific PSO services 
in any particular country. 
 
As identified in Merkert and O’Fee (2013), there are many areas where European PSO air service 
operations can be improved with one being to increase the level of competition for such air services. It 
has been shown that this is the unanimous view of the European public transport authorities, as they 
are well aware of the price, efficiency and consumer advantages resulting from competition in other 
sectors. However, an enduring feature of the European PSO tendering process is how few operators 
actually compete on routes. Figure 1 illustrates exemplarily the level of competition for PSO air 
routes in Norway in 2013.  
 
 
Source: Northpoint Aviation Services (2013) 
Figure 1: Number of Bidders in 2013 Norwegian PSO competition 
 
Despite best efforts the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications nearly 50% of the 
PSO bundles tendered in 2013 were uncontested and the majority of the remainder only had two 
contestants.  Only 10% of the routes offered had more than two contestants with both of the relevant 
routes targeting the capital airport. As most of the routes in Norway have not much competition from 
other modes of transport (Merkert and Mangia, 2014), the government is keen on encouraging 
competition for the PSO tenders. Our previous work has suggested that the motivation of transport 
authorities in other European countries in terms of achieving reasonable levels of competition for PSO 
services is often less and hence it is probable that even less competition for PSOs is experienced in 
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those regions. A particular issue appears to be cross-border competition for such contracts (Merkert 
and O’Fee, 2013). 
 
This paper aims to understand some of the reasons behind the apparent lack of competition for 
European public air services by evaluating senior management views of both airlines who currently 
operate PSO air service contracts in Europe and those who have operated PSO contracts in the past or 
are potentially in a position to enter the PSO air service market in the future. This has never been 
attempted before. From our previous studies we know that PSO airline efficiency (Merkert and 
Williams, 2013) and PSO contracts can be improved (Merkert and Hensher, 2013), and we know 
something of the view of one side of the contractual relationship, namely the public transport 
authorities (Merkert and O’Fee, 2013). What we do not know is the view of airline managers on what 
inspires, or does not inspire, them into competing for, and operating, PSO contracts in their home and 
other European markets (including issues surrounding business development, trust, contracts etc.). 
The air operators’ views will help produce a mirror image to the PSO authorities’ views presented in 
our previous work. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the methodology. Following 
a discussion of our key findings in section 3 and we present our conclusions and some policy 
recommendations in section 4. 
2. Methodology and sample 
Based on the literature review of the preceding section, we aim to shed light on airline managers’ 
perspectives on PSO practices of their home and other European markets, which includes incentives, 
contractual arrangements and the relationship (i.e. trust) in the procuring/tendering public transport 
authorities. As the competition for PSO air contracts is not very intense in terms of number of 
contestants, we wanted to test various attitudes regarding perceptions of unattractive risk sharing and 
trust between the operators and authorities (i.e. outside the operators’ home markets) as well as 
possible perceptions about lack of transparency. In order to establish evidence on this, we carried out 
a survey of PSO and non-PSO EU air operators, who are all eligible to bid for PSOs.  
 
As a first step we endeavoured to compile a comprehensive list of European regional passenger 
service air operators.  We even included some air cargo and ACMI operators who could conceivably 
migrate to passenger services with the right opportunity.  We then endeavoured to find a named senior 
contact within that airline to answer our survey appropriately. One early impression from these 
efforts, was to underline the significant amount of consolidation that has taken place in the European 
regional airline since the last market structure analysis by one of the authors in 2012 (Merkert and 
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Williams 2013). While many commentators and the public are aware of the big mergers, such as the 
one between British Airways and Iberia that formed International Airlines Group, financial failures 
(e.g., Sky Europe, Highland Airways, Augsburg Airways, OLT, Cirrus Airlines) and mergers at the 
regional airline level are often less well noticed. Recent examples of merger and acquisition activities 
in the European PSO airline sector include Finncom (acquired by Finnair 40% and Flybe 60% and 
now integrated into the latter), Société HOP! (regional subsidiary of Air France which was formed 
from the merger of Airlinair, Brit Air and Régional CAE), AEGEAN acquiring Olympic Air, Air One 
becoming a low cost carrier after becoming a branch of Alitalia and Livingston operating Italian PSOs 
instead and finally CityJet and VLM Airlines being sold to Intro Aviation and then merged with 
InterSky.  
 
A desk officer at the European Commission (DG Move) helped add to our list with suggestions from 
their perspective, and this enabled us to close some remaining gaps and achieved a more complete 
view of the market participants as of April 2014.  
 
The most difficult part of our analysis was to then identify the key account person within the airline 
who would also be willing to participate in our research. Although we had a good network of contacts 
from previous studies, because of the degree of consolidation and the generally dynamic nature of the 
business, some of those contacts had moved on or changed jobs within the airline. For example, the 
PSO manager for a large European airline who manages just one PSO route had recently left the 
company with no-one else now feeling confident enough to answer our questions. As the response 
often depends on the role, we were aiming to have the CEO/MD, the chief commercial manager or 
someone within a business development position responding to our survey and for a number of 
airlines that meant that we had several responses (which were then averaged). This was to overcome 
the disadvantages of not being able to conduct face to face interviews and also to account for issues 
related to top management heterogeneity (Priem, Lyon, and Dessm, 1999). In total we invited about 
80 senior managers in 26 PSO airlines and 35 non PSO airlines to participate. We achieved a 39% 
response rate overall and a 56% response rate of PSO airlines currently operating in Europe (which 
was heartening given the sensitivities and language barriers involved in such an exercise).  
 
As shown in Table 1, our final sample includes valid/full responses from 24 airlines from across 
Europe. The 14 PSO operators that have participated in our research collectively operate 65 PSO 
routes (as of May 2014) and have operated a total of 112 PSO routes over the last ten years. The 10 
non PSO operators represent all sizes of airlines in Europe and we were satisfied that the sample was 
generally geographically comprehensive (responses from Greenland to Greece). In terms of airline 
participation we did not encounter fear of sharing sensitive information encouraged by our 
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reassurances about confidentiality, but it was noticeable that none of the large LCC airlines in Europe 
“felt in a position to contribute to our study”. The research was further informed by the previous 
coalface experience of one of the study authors, who participated in over twenty PSO tender 
submissions representing an air operator, over a twelve year period, and was successful in eight of 
these competitions. 
 
Table 1: Sample of PSO and non-PSO airlines 
Country  PSO operators  Country  Non-PSO operators 
England  2  England  3 
Finland  1  Germany  2 
France  1  Ireland  1 
Greece  1  Netherlands  1 
Greenland  1  Slovenia  1 
Iceland  1  Spain  1 
Italy  2  Sweden  1 
Norway  1     
Portugal  1     
Scotland  2     
Spain  1     
Source: Own analysis  
 
Our survey aimed at exploring different aspects of their experience and perceptions, which it was 
hoped could lead to identify areas for further examination, or for improvement. A key hypothesis of 
our research was that language barriers would deter cross border competition for PSO contracts. In 
order to address the context appropriately, the survey were divided into two types – one for operators 
already operating PSOs, and the other for operators who do not currently operate PSOs.  
For the PSO operators an attempt was made to gauge their success rate in bidding. We further 
asked them whether they bid internationally, and whether they found the data provided in the tender 
documentation adequate and how it might be improved.  We probed their awareness of sources of 
information on European PSOs and how that might be improved.  We also asked them how they 
thought PSO competitions were assessed and how they should be assessed. There were some 
questions on their trust level and working relationship with their sponsoring authority as well as their 
attitudes with regard to other country’s public transport authorities. A series of questions were asked 
about the timescales of the process and whether these were adequate and whether changes would be 
welcomed.  We did ask some more standalone questions on whether they undertook collaborative 
marketing of their PSO routes with public agencies, how they sourced aircraft if they successfully bid 
(as this does have a bearing on timescales, cost and risk) and on the size of their subsidised/protected 
routes in relation to commercial routes in their portfolio.   
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The non PSO operators were asked a similar range of questions, but with variations exploring their 
reasons for not bidding, or perception about why they had not been successful in their bids. They were 
asked for suggestions on how PSOs could be made more open to competition and all operators were 
asked whether they thought that PSOs deter competition and can act as a form of market 
protectionism. 
 
Several aspects should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. The range in size and 
sophistication of airlines is very large; from small 9 seat operations employing a handful of people to 
full service flag carriers. The operators, who did run PSOs, again varied in their activity levels with 12 
respondents/airlines covering 97 PSO route operations over the last ten years, and of these 6 operators 
fulfilled 88 out of the 97 routes represented. The dynamics in the PSO market also became apparent 
as for example one operator went from 10 routes to one and another from 35 to seven routes during 
the last ten years.  This results in the situation whereby some issues are best considered operator by 
operator, whilst others provide a different priority sequence when considered under a weighted system 
that ensures big PSO operators/programmes voices are heard more proportionately. 
3. Results  
 
When analysing the responses of the PSO operators, we found that they not only collectively had 
operated 112 PSO routes in the last ten years but also had undertaken 59 unsuccessful bids over the 
same period.  However this picture of competitive dynamism is slightly countered by the fact that 
when their PSO success rate is worked out they range from a 33% success rate to a 100% success rate 
with an average of 71% (29% of respondents had a 100% success rate), which does suggest that 
successful PSO operators enter tender competitions with a high likelihood of success, and there are 
some local champions who rarely fail. 
 
Of the ten non PSO operators who responded only three had bid for PSOs in the past ten years; all 
unsuccessfully. When asked would they bid for PSOs in other European countries, six of the 14 PSO 
operators answered in the affirmative.  Eight indicated in the negative. Of those saying no, when 
further asked to categorise their reasoning the answers illustrated in Figure 1 emerged from the two 
classes of respondents. 
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Note: Presented as % share of airlines that selected the attribute in total PSO or total non PSO operator 
respondents 
Figure 1: Deterrents of running PSOs in other European countries 
 
As we can see the main inhibitor is the cost and complexity of opening and operating an additional 
base.  Surprisingly language barriers (our key hypothesis), unattractiveness of contracts and the lack 
of suitable interline agreements were not even mentioned whilst the other inhibitors received single 
votes, apart from two operators concluding that the incumbent was too strong.  However it should be 
noted that one substantial multi-PSO regional operator did contend that the compensation offered by 
the transport authority/procuring institution was not sufficient.  Only three of the non PSO operators 
(out of ten) indicated that they would be prepared to bid in other countries, and these three were the 
only three non PSO respondents who have ever bid for PSOs even in their domestic market. This 
suggests that having negative PSO bidding experience domestically has not deterred them from 
considering engaging in international PSO operations in the future.  
 
The non PSO operators’ results to the supplementary question were slightly different, as for them the 
additional option in not having an interline agreement at the metropolitan airport in a PSO proved to 
be a significant additional factor in not bidding for PSO contracts. 
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When asked if the data provided by the tendering authorities is sufficient, five out of 14 PSO 
operators and six out of the ten non PSO operators indicated that it was.  Interpretation of this result is 
difficult, especially as practices do vary across the EU, so a simple comparison cannot be made.  
However it would be reasonably safe to say that satisfaction in tender information was reasonable, but 
improvement if decided upon, could be guided by the summary of answers from the dissatisfied as 
displayed in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Note: Measured in % share of airlines that selected the attribute in total PSO or total non PSO airlines 
Figure 2: Information that would help increasing airline participating in air PSO tenders 
 
Once again practices in different jurisdictions in Europe are markedly different, and incumbent PSO 
operators are likely to be more protective on route data than aspirants, as they may consider much of it 
commercially sensitive.  Nevertheless each of the options offered received support from more than 
one operator and seasonality, revenue data and current subsidy levels were all popular options. 
 
Of the other suggestions operators mentioned the risks surrounding a potential Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) costs, and another the desire to have the tender 
documentation translated into English and not just local languages, which we were surprised was an 
issue, even if only in this one instance.  A non PSO operator felt that tenders often written already for 
the “winner”. 
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It was interesting to gauge if operators monitor the European Union Official Journal for PSO or other 
published PSO opportunities? Nine out of the fourteen PSO operators and two out of the ten non PSO 
operators did so.  When asked if they are aware that PSO information notices are published by DG 
MOVE and do they use DG MOVE’s EU PSO listing – 5 of the fourteen PSO operators and 3 out of 
the ten non PSO respondents answered in the affirmative. This suggests that there is industry 
awareness progress to be made here, and our research hopefully may be part of steps into that 
direction. 
 
We then progressed to a more qualitative research section and first asked for suggestions regarding 
improving the utility of the PSO list for bidders. The issue that was mentioned most often was that the 
EC PSO list should be updated more regularly (“current one is out of date with as 2013”) and that 
operators should receive email notice (“subscription should be offered”) when new tenders or 
information are added to the last. It was also seen as useful to establish an archive of past tenders and 
preferred bidders and it was generally felt that the communication via aviation authorities and the 
European Regions Airlines Association could be improved and more designed for the actual 
operators’ needs. Our second qualitative question aimed to reveal how in the PSO operators’ views 
PSO tenders can be made more open to more competition. Interestingly (in line with Merkert and 
Hensher, 2013), most operators felt that the current tenders and contracts are too complicated for the 
type of operators interested and able to bid for them. Other than simplifying the process, improving 
the time scales involved (which reportedly favour incumbent airlines) and publicising the tenders as 
broadly as possible, there was surprisingly a shared perception among the PSO operators indicating 
that the current PSO tenders are appropriate for achieving competition. The non PSO operators added 
that they were often not informed (contacted directly) about PSO tenders and that it would be 
therefore useful to publish and regular updates of all PSO tenders (in all common EU languages) on 
the DG-MOVE website, which should include more information to assist non-local carriers in 
establishing the economics of a route to enable a speedy evaluation to be conducted. In this rather 
qualitative exploration, non-PSO operators therefore confirmed some of our hypothesis, but as shown 
above when asking all types of operators about language issues, it has not shown to be significant (to 
say the least). As expected, particularly the non-PSO operators felt that as routes are operated under 
PSO (tax payer) governance, such information should be in the public domain. Some North European 
non PSO operators even expressed disconsolantly that there is now more than sufficient competition 
for such contracts particularly from Eastern European operators.   
 
We then asked them about the top three selection criteria that they consider PSO authorities use when 
choosing their preferred bidder (e.g. price, quality, inter-lining, financial fitness, safety, trust) and the 
top criteria mentioned in almost every response was price (some operators thought it was price, price 
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and price!) followed by quality and financial fitness. Safety and inter-lining were also mentioned but 
much less often than the top three. 
 
When asked to summarise the quality of their working relationship with their main PSO managing 
authority 90 per cent of the respondents (when weighted by PSO routes) indicated that they had either 
a very good or a good relationship with their respective authority. The remaining 10 per cent selected 
neutral and no operator suggested a poor or very poor relationship, which is better than what we had 
anticipated. When PSO operators were asked if their business relationship with the principal has 
improved over time eight out of fourteen answered in the affirmative, which is more of a trend than 
expected as at the outset we hypothesised that the longer they knew each other the more they would 
tire of each other, but perhaps explicable by transaction cost theory. With regard to whether they 
trusted the PSO sponsoring authorities that their airline works with (to treat them fairly) twelve out of 
the fourteen respondents agreed. Seven out of the ten non PSO respondents answered an equivalent 
question also in the affirmative. We then applied the same trust question to other European PSO 
sponsoring authorities and eight out of fourteen answered in the affirmative which does represent a 
drop in trust in ‘foreign jurisdictions’.  However some of the non positive respondents may have just 
been skipping a question they perceived as not relevant, rather than positively expressing distrust. We 
also asked if they trust European PSO authorities (also differentiated by their level of PSO operating 
status) that they do not currently work with that they would treat their airline fairly and the pattern 
shown in Figure 3 emerged.  It becomes apparent the both PSO and non PSO operators have slightly 
more trust in Northern European PSO authorities and that Greece seems to have some issues in terms 
of their image with the operators from other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
Analysing air operators’ managerial perceptions of incentives for competing for regional PSO air 
services within Europe 
Merkert and O’Fee 
 
 
Note: Measured in % share of airlines that trust in authority in total PSO or total non PSO airlines 
Figure 3: Trust in PSO authorities (home compared to selected European countries) 
 
A number of explanatory comments were also offered to the preferences indicated, with the most 
frequent one being that they had “No such experience with other countries”. It should also be noted 
that 16 of the 23 respondents could be described as northern European operators so that the lower 
scores for South Europe may partly be a reflection of distance and unfamiliarity.  However trust in 
Scandinavia and the British Isles seems strongest. 
 
To our question on whether PSOs deter competition and can act as a form of market protectionism 
seven out of the fourteen PSO operators responded that they agreed with the comment and eight out of 
the ten non PSO operators also agreed.  Interpretation of this result is difficult as the question, in 
retrospect, combines a value judgement assessment (market protectionism is a bad thing) with a 
statement of fact, because most PSOs deliberately do protect the operator, because the route is thin.  
However unsurprisingly we can see that more non PSO operators are in some way disgruntled with a 
system they are not partaking in. 
 
When PSO operators were asked to offer the top three issues they would like improved in public 
authority PSO contracts with brief explanations the top three comments were better incentives, 
risk/reward sharing and less focus on price in the selection process. Bigger contracts, more marketing 
collaboration as well as more flexibility in terms of equipment and schedule were also mentioned. 
These comments support Merkert and O’Fee’s (2013) finding that PSO sponsoring authorities need to 
take more interest in marketing the PSO route and need to design contracts to incentivise air operators 
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to develop route revenues, and not thereby loose equivalent subsidy as a result of any such successful 
efforts. 
 
There were then a series of questions concerned with the timescales of various PSO tendering 
processes.  These issues were probed partly because the PSO regulations themselves requires a 
minimum six month pre-notification requirement, which one suspects was introduced without the sort 
of frontline research into the travails of air operators here being undertaken. 
 
When asked how long do you need to be able to adequately prepare a PSO tender response, the 
responses exhibited quite a smooth bell curve centred around six weeks, as shown in Figure 4.   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Time needed to adequately prepare a PSO tender response (in weeks) 
 
Nine out of the fourteen PSO operators answered the generalised question regarding timescales being 
sufficient in the affirmative, with one adding “some are very short notice”, and there was hence no 
consistency. The dissatisfied respondents were given the chance to suggest a realistic timescale and 
three opted for eight weeks whilst one suggested six weeks.  These various probings seem to suggest 
that quite a few operators find a four week response challenging.  It could be added that this is 
feedback from successful PSO operators and we speculate that unsuccessful operators, or operators 
investigating a completely new route prefer more time. However less dissatisfaction with this tender 
response timescale was encountered than hypothesised by the researchers at the outset. 
 
The interrogation then moved to the requisite preferred gear up time after award of contract and 
before launch.  How long does your airline require after award of a new contract to successfully 
prepare for route launch? Apart from one respondent who answered: “contingent upon the size and 
scale of PSO”, the range of responses as illustrated in Figure 5 was an average of 13 weeks, with 2 
operators thinking that as much as 6 months would be reasonable.   
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Figure 5: Preferred time needed after award of a new contract to prepare for route launch (weeks) 
 
In our experience this should give pause for thought for many transport authorities, as the current 
legislation permits change of common practice and we will explore this further in our conclusions. 
 
A further aspect of the gearing up challenge asked the respondents on how they sourced the aircraft 
when last successful in a PSO, with the aim to better understand what challenges lay in that direction. 
The answers, illustrated in Figure 6, were not unsurprising, as the typical timescales do not permit 
fresh sourcing of ‘new’ aircraft (outside of immediate or easy access options). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Aircraft sources for last successful PSO bid 
 
 
When asked if their PSO aircraft undertakes work outside of their PSO commitments eleven out of the 
fourteen respondents replied affirmatively, which suggests that allocation of costs and rewards 
between PSO and non PSO work will be an issue between many sponsoring transport authorities and 
operators.  Our research did not explore this potentially very interesting topic in any further depth. 
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Focusing again on the airline/authority relationship, we than asked how often the airline managers 
physically meet the principals of their various PSO route(s) each year (please note each different 
authority if applicable)? There appears to be a range of annual, half yearly, quarterly or monthly 
meeting systems in use. Overall, we could not establish a clear trend in what would be an appropriate 
frequency for face to face meetings (and the cost benefit of more or less regular meetings, or meeting 
substitutes). 
 
Our previous PSO research suggested that sponsoring authorities should take more interest in route 
promotion and marketing and prompted this question – “Do you undertake collaborative marketing of 
the PSO route(s) with other stakeholders – provide examples of cooperation?”  Predictably only four 
offered some positive response and these comments were: a) codeshare scheme between parent 
company and subsidiary, b) airports and local media, c) marketing with sponsoring city and d) current 
PSO sponsor.  If we discount the first answer as not amounting to collaborative marketing with the 
sponsoring authority we can see that only three out of fourteen or 21% are involved in some sort of 
partnership marketing.  In fact when we consider this by number of current PSO routes we can see 
that only three out of the 65 current routes represented by our sample or 4.5% of routes are covered by 
such collaborative marketing.  This is very much in line with our discovery from previous research 
that few sponsoring authorities stipulate marketing in their PSO contracts, or use it in any systematic 
way to assess the quality of bids.  Worse still the way many PSO contracts are constructed the airline 
receives no benefit from successful marketing, as additional yield will reduce their subsidy 
accordingly.  To our knowledge no PSO has ever escaped the PSO designation and become open 
market and self-funding.  This common oversight may be one reason for this state of affairs, which in 
our view leaves room for improvement and prompts policy suggestions which are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
We finally asked the airline managers how many of their PSO contracts are open PSOs (more than 
one operator can fulfil) and only two operators representing only eight PSO routes answered in the 
affirmative. When asked if their PSOs received subsidy, most PSOs, apart from some routes in Italy, 
France and Norway appear to.  Nearly all the PSOs apart from some in Portugal and Spain are 
restricted to one operator, which is the most popular interpretation and application of the PSO 
regulations.  
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4. Conclusions and policy/strategy recommendations 
 
This paper set out to establish evidence on why airlines engage or do not engage in PSO bidding and 
operating activities, particularly across borders, as this might illustrate barriers to healthy competition 
and market efficiency. We identified a number of deterrents for PSO operators not to go abroad (the 
main reasons being the cost and risk of developing additional bases and for non PSO operators not 
having the right equipment or interline agreements) and participate in PSO tenders, but also found 
evidence that issues such as language mattered substantially less than expected. Our key hypothesis 
was that language/culture barriers were a significant deterrent for cross-border PSO contract bidding 
and although language per se was not seen as a barrier, there were some indications that culture was 
although much less than expected still of a slight concern to some operators (culture issues in the 
sense of a fear of different legal systems and practices, employment law, contract law, local 
favouritism, making money of foreign operator with different charges etc.). While there still appears a 
lack of competition for PSO contracts some operators felt that the level of competition is already very 
intense (in terms of cost pressures) on some routes, particularly where (East) European operators with 
a lower cost base bid on West European routes. Also trust levels, particularly in regards to PSO 
authorities based in north European countries, are higher than initially speculated by the researchers, 
as are working relationships once a PSO operator enters a contract.    
 
Based on our findings we derived the following recommendations to the various stakeholders, which 
in combination have the potential (at least in our view) to better facilitate the single market and 
promote competition and cross border activity within the EU regional aviation market. 
 
Air operators can better avail themselves of the PSO information that is available via DG-MOVE and 
the EU Journal, and can register with DG-MOVE to receive their weekly newsletter which highlights 
PSO tenders. Airline managers should approach and enter into dialogue with identified PSO 
sponsoring authorities well in advance of any invitation to tender.  This allows them to gather data 
and intelligence of the route outside of the strictures of the formal tender process, and it also allows 
them to assess the authority’s interest in, or appetite for, new bidders in forthcoming tenders. 
 
PSO Sponsoring Authorities should extend the lead time of their PSO tender competitions. 
As explored in this paper the timescales for typical PSOs are very, very tight.  As section 4 of Article 
16 of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 states; 
“The Commission shall make the invitation to tender known through an information notice published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. The deadline for submission of tenders shall not be earlier than two 
months after the day of publication of such an information notice. In case the tender concerns a route to which 
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the access had already been limited to one carrier in accordance with Article 16(9), the invitation to tender will 
be published at least six months before the start of the new concession in order to assess the continued necessity 
of the restricted access.” 
 
Project Task   Pre-launch time indication 
1. EU Journal 
publication  6 months before launch 
2. Tender response 
period  2 months 
3. Tender evaluation 
Period  1 month 
4. Tender award - pause 
for any appeals  2 weeks 
5. Contract signing  At best ten weeks before launch 
 
As we can appreciate there is no room for slippage and a 10 week lead time is the best that is possible 
under the scenario outlined above.  It seems to us that this tight timescale strongly favours the 
incumbent and inhibits competition.  There is one obvious and easy response.  Sponsoring authorities 
should be reminded that the phrase “the invitation to tender will be published at least six months 
before the start of the new concession” provides them with an opportunity to publish their invitation 
to tender (ITT) with times greater than six months.  Most authorities treat the six month publication 
deadline as the norm or target, rather than the minimum.  Air operators, particularly aspiring new 
route air operators, consider six months as very tight. 
 
The PSO authorities should further proactively canvas air operators about their forthcoming tender 
competitions.  The list of EU operators in not endless and is even shorter when route-suitable aircraft 
types are considered. The PSO authority should also provide comprehensive data in their tender 
documentation to aid new entrants in their calculations and tender preparations.  Indeed the balance 
between the commercially sensitive information of the current operator and information that ‘belongs’ 
to the route, which is the ultimate responsibility of the sponsoring authority, could often be moved.  
We would suggest that the authority develops KPIs for the route, which should include key route data, 
and these reports should be summarised in the ITT.  We see no reason why seasonal data, total route 
revenue data, freight revenue data, historic route data, route reliability and punctuality data, and 
average occupancy on different flights during the week are not all made available.  The airline 
arguably can retain confidentiality over its specific yield management strategy (variable ticket 
pricing). The sponsoring authority should further consider whether its supervision of the PSO route is 
optimal.  This research only touched upon this issue, but generally indicates wide variation in the 
levels of supervision, but with no real understanding of any variability in its efficacy.  
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As setting up a new base has been identified as a major inhibition for potential bidders the sponsoring 
authority should consider strategies to reduce the perception of difficulty in this regard.  The obvious 
device of including the relevant contact at each airport with their contact details in the ITT is a simple 
and easy step.  One of the authors of this paper was involved with a client (albeit in a non PSO 
circumstance) where a local liaison person was appointed to help the airline source local crew 
accommodation, sort out hangar arrangements and be introduced to airport management and handling 
agents.  This sort of familiarisation effort could help reduce real and perceived barriers to new base 
development. 
 
Critically, the PSO authorities should develop a tender contract that truly values marketing and 
rewards success in building the route.  This aspect was picked up in earlier research into transport 
authorities’ practice (Merkert & O’Fee, 2013) and has been validated in mirror image by the results 
from the air operators.  The challenge is to lift patronage and revenue on the routes in question and if 
the local authority does not take an interest, why should the airline, especially as many contracts do 
not reward them for doing so.  
 
Additionally tender assessment criteria should be developed to more consciously and prominently 
reward superior marketing plans. The PSO contracts developed should share rewards and risk 
equitably. Our previous research (Merkert & O’Fee, 2013) has shown that clear and powerful 
incentives need to be created for the operator to innovate and develop the PSO route. The key to 
unlocking innovation is to allow the operator to keep some, or arguably all, of any additional revenue 
generated by such marketing activities in the current tender round. This is where operators’ and 
authorities’ views differ the most (when comparing the results of our two papers). However, the buyer 
can take the view that once any advances in revenue become embedded on the route the authority will 
enjoy reduced subsidy requests in future tender rounds.  
 
At the higher, supranational level, DG-MOVE could compile and perhaps more importantly 
frequently update a list of contact points for all EU operators and permit PSO sponsoring authorities 
to use that list to contact air operators directly (while the former is a view shared by operators and 
PSO authorities, the latter was unsurprisingly only of importance to the operators).  The list should 
include key profiling data such as aircraft types operated and size of fleet, and be summarised in a 
way that is easy to understand for non-aviation specialists such as the sponsoring authority often have 
in post. DG-MOVE could further improve the efficacy of its PSO listing in ways indicated by this 
research.  Indeed we would suggest that DG-MOVE sees their PSO listing as not only delivering EU 
wide transparency on the PSO system, but as a means to cultivate the single market in this domain by 
more consciously serving the needs of the operators. DG-MOVE could also facilitate sponsoring PSO 
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authority gatherings to cultivate and disseminate best PSO practice.  There should be a legal 
dimension to any collective networking, as there is wide variation of interpretation within the EU of 
what is, and is not, permissible under the same regulations (Merkert & O’Fee, 2013). Finally, DG-
MOVE should consider facilitating some sort of gathering for both sponsoring authorities and air 
operators – e.g. a biennial conference, where authorities could present on their upcoming needs, and 
airlines could interact with them. Our research has shown that authorities and operators are often 
similar in their views and that they share the common aim to support and grow air transport to 
regional and remote areas. It is in many cases just the appropriate facilitation of information and 
engagement of operators that limits the (cross-border) competition for PSO contracts. There may of 
course be electronic ways to facilitate some of this communication and networking via automated 
alerts and emails that may be worth exploring.  
 
While we are confident in our findings it is worth mentioning a couple of limitations. Firstly, although 
having good coverage, we have not managed to get responses from all PSO and non-PSO airlines. 
Secondly, the named contact who responded to the survey did not always hold the same role in the 
company and their views may well be both a mixture of their personal perspective and the corporate 
view. Both aspects leave scope for further research which should also focus on changes of 
perceptions, attitudes and relationship (i.e. levels of trust) over time as not only the regulatory 
framework but also PSO airline markets change (i.e. mature and consolidate). Further research would 
also be beneficial in the area of best and permissible practice with regard to PSO route marketing. 
Discussion and research could fruitfully be had on what levels of route information are appropriate 
and reasonable for inclusion in ITT to ensure transparency is maximised. 
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